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A HETERODOX CATECHISM 
Paul Campos* 
Let me try to state in a nutshell how I view the work of judg-
ing-my approach, I believe, is neither liberal nor conserva-
tive .... As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes counseled, one of 
the most sacred duties of a judge is not to read her convictions 
into the Constitution. I have tried and I will continue to try to 
follow the model Justice Holmes set in holding that duty 
sacred. 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
What did Judge Ginsburg promise the assembled multi-
tudes? 
That she would judge rather than legislate; that her views on 
all matters pertaining to the meaning of the Constitution would 
not affect her views concerning the Constitution's meaning; that 
this paradoxical task was not only possible but indeed a sacred 
trust best illustrated by the restrained judicial activism mani-
fested in the constitutional jurisprudence of that Nietzchian 
Christian, or pacific warrior, Oliver Wendell Holmes, and that 
she was not liberal nor conservative but would be both or 
neither, as her oath of service to the law required. 
What reaction did these promises elicit? 
Universal cries of hallelujah, unto us a judge is given. 
Is it possible to enumerate the sources of this splendid 
unanimity? 
Such sources included, but were not limited to, the judge's 
gender, which elicited from that mostly male consortium a chival-
rous reserve reminiscent of bygone days of errantry; the still-
fresh recollection of similar proceedings involving ~hen-Judge 
now-Justice Clarence Thomas and then-Professor now-Saint 
Anita Hill, and the concomitant unhappiness which resulted 
from that less than optimal display of what might charitably be 
characterized as the tangled passions of a human heart, and the 
feminine reticence or even revulsion with which that display was 
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met; the even more distasteful memories of the unforgettable 
auto-da-fe featuring then-Judge now-iconic victim of an unscru-
pulous smear campaign Robert Bork; the tedium which any ex-
amination of questions of constitutional practice and theory 
naturally generates in everyone associated with or subjected to 
such questions; the certain knowledge that the principled distinc-
tion between law and politics was fully appreciated by the guest 
of honor; and (not least) the power that wishful thinking always 
exercises over the affairs of men. 
Did certain questions germane to the issues at hand then go 
unasked? 
They did. 
What examples come most readily to mind? 
First, some inquiry into the ontological status of that object 
of veneration yclept The Constitution, to which everyone (Sena-
tors, Judges, Presidents, Popes, Emperors, Antichrists) must 
swear a most solemn oath to uphold, come hell or high water, 
subject, it goes without saying, to those procedures for amend-
ment exhaustively described in Article V of that self-same docu-
ment, and to no other earthly or infernal power world without 
end amen. 
What makes such an inquiry desirable? 
The confusion resulting from an inability or unwillingness to 
identify the meaning of that document with some set of semantic 
intentions emanating from an identifiable agent. 
Does not the text of the document provide an adequate 
source of emanating signification? 
No. 
Why not? 
Because of the perverse semantic plurality of natural lan-
guages, which provide an infinite play of signifiers to which more 
than one meaning may always be attached. 
Does the attribution of meaning through the act of identify-
ing that meaning with the semantic intentions of a particular au-
thor or group of authors adequately specify the meaning of the 
text in question? 
Yes. However, the functional inadequacy of intentionalist 
accounts of constitutional interpretation are too well known to 
suffer repetition. 
What assertions will be made in the course of suffering that 
repetition? 
1994] HETERODOX CATECHISM 67 
That among the innumerable sins of originalism might be 
counted: the epistemological breakdown almost certain to occur 
when future generations attempt to determine just what someone 
meant or did not mean when employing human speech across the 
unbridgeable chasm of the obscuring centuries; the interpretive 
crisis occasioned by the ineluctable modality of human experi-
ence, to wit, the unimpeachable fact that the authors of that cryp-
tic document failed to consider such cultural and technological 
wonders as wiretaps, interstate telephone lines, facsimile ma-
chines, condoms, the inflammable nature of national symbols, 
and the secularization of Christian holidays via the implacable 
logic of consumerism, not to mention the unforeseen conse-
quences flowing out of an ever-broadening stream of interstate 
commerce that would come to include (among other things) 
cows, wheat, lottery tickets, slaves, compact disc players, certifi-
cates of deposit, greeting cards, treasures from furthest Araby, 
financial quotations, photographs of naked women engaged in 
crimes against nature, electronic signals bearing discrete parcels 
of information amenable to interpretation via a binary code as 
first envisioned by that enigmatic genius of the cryptographic art, 
Alan Thring, baseball gloves, Japanese ceramics, sheet music, the 
unwritten history of the future, and the tangled passions of a 
human heart (see infra); the conceptual impossibility of recon-
ciling the various conflicting intentions of the Framers, the Ra-
tifiers, and the People Themselves; the natural repugnance felt 
by all at being forever within the clammy grasp of the past's dead 
hand; the obvious reluctance of the contemporary American 
public to accept what would then be the inescapable truth that 
the state of Connecticut was not constitutionally prohibited from 
violating the sacred precincts of the marital bedroom; and the 
simple yet embarrassing fact that no one whose opinion in these 
matters counted had given sustained attention to what the prob-
lematic authors of the Constitution, however defined, had meant 
by the words of that document since Marbury v. Madison or time 
immemorial, whichever came first. 
Do the previous decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court, ennobled by the ineffable dignity that the principle of 
stare decisis lends to these fragments we have shored against our 
ruin, provide, in and of themselves, an authoritative source of 
constitutional meaning? 
No, because this Court always stands ready to correct its er-
rors, even though of long standing, those errors being all but in-
corrigible to legislative remedy. 
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To what additional sources of signification did Judge Gins-
burg allude, given the evident failure of constitutional text, au-
thorial intention, and judicial precedent to provide adequate 
sources of contemporary constitutional meaning? 
She alluded to a jurisprudential method. 
How will this method affect her constitutional practice? 
Evidence can be adduced from the judge's own opinions, 
produced via the Federal Circuit Court for the District of 
Columbia. 
What evidence does a cursory examination of this jurispru-
dential product yield? 
That the then-Judge now-Justice will employ the procrustean 
methods of her generation's jurisprudential mentors Henry Hart 
and Albert Sacks, progenitors of The Legal Process (tentative 
draft, 1958) in order to better achieve the aspirational goals of 
our constitutional order through a scrupulous interpretation of 
an infinite variety of ambiguous legislative acts, conflicting lower 
court rulings, and (especially) the complex directives of adminis-
trative agencies, so as to lend formal certainty to social interac-
tions of every kind, do what substantial justice requires, and, in 
general, make the world safe for bureaucracy. 
What judicial procedures do these methods involve? 
They involve, firstly, a careful not to say exhaustive review 
of all the relevant legal materials whose meaning, properly inter-
preted, might throw light on the proper resolution of the sorts of 
cases and controversies that courts display a special institutional 
competence toward resolving; secondly, the formulation of vari-
ous complex interlocking directives by means of which the prop-
erly interpreted meaning of the materials may be made 
synonymous with those interpretations that flow from the proper 
deployment of those interpretive methods which give the mean-
ing of those materials a public and formal character, thereby 
making that meaning accessible to everyone who has undergone 
a socialization process resembling that to which students at elite 
American law schools were subjected, circa 1958; thirdly, the ac-
ceptance of the pragmatic yet principled dictum that law is a pur-
posive activity which continually strives to solve the basic 
problems of social living; fourthly, the full recognition of the in-
dispensable role played by that most lawyerly virtue, procedure, 
in assuring a kind of objectivity to what would otherwise degen-
erate into an unconstrained act of judicial fiat; fifthly, the estab-
lishment of the principle or public norm that decisions which are 
the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures for mak-
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ing decisions of this kind ought to be accepted as binding on the 
whole society unless and until they are duly changed; and sixthly, 
the sobering realization that the only alternative to regularized 
and peaceable methods of decision is a disintegrating resort to 
violence. 
Can an example be given of a methodological directive 
which these methods presume to compel? 
That a statute ought always to be presumed to be the work 
of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably. 
What does the substance of this particular conclusion 
indicate? 
That the methods propounded by The Legal Process (tenta-
tive draft, 1958) are heavily dependent on the tautological or 
even shamanistic invocation of the signifier reasonable; that rea-
sonable men will seem reasonably reasonable only under condi-
tions that generate sufficient ideological consensus as to what 
reason requires; that the elite American law school circa 1958 
was indeed such a place; that the now-mind of the then-student 
Ruth Ginsburg appears to represent a paradigmatic product of 
that environment; and that this mind's subsequent legal career 
provides a performative demonstration of the almost fanatical 
worship of technocratic rationality which that environment ap-
parently induced. 
What is the central tenet of this form of worship? 
That law is a rational self-conscious activity. 
What heretical suspicion must then be suppressed at all sub-
sequent costs, intellectual, psychological, and economic? 
That we have no idea what we are talking about. 
How is this suppression achieved? 
Through the painful evocation those fine and careful distinc-
tions that mark the work of the legal craftswoman as she pursues 
with an almost Sapphic passion a jealous mistress along those 
well-trodden paths formed by the thrilling tradition of Anglo-
American law, as this law strives to fulfill that glorious destiny 
foreordained by its place in the structure of American institu-
tions as a voice of reason, charged with the creative function of 
discerning afresh and of articulating and developing impersonal 
and durable principles of constitutional law. 
What other phrase describes this activity? 
Boring your audience into submission. 
What jurisprudential virtues did Judge Ginsburg's testimony 
exemplify? 
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Powerful intelligence, as demonstrated by her manipulation 
of many a Solomonic puzzle prepared for her by the Judiciary 
Committee staff; great patience, as manifested by her willingness 
to stoically endure the torrent of verbal nonsense issuing forth 
from the Committee's chair, the honorable Joseph Biden of Del-
aware; surprising candor, in regard to her answers concerning the 
constitutional status of abortion rights, whether located, as we 
feel they are, in the general vicinity of the Fourth, Ninth, and 
Nineteenth Amendments, or alternatively, as suggested by the 
Judge herself, in a dynamic reinterpretation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause; and political acumen, as illustrated by her deft de-
flection of various potentially problematic questions regarding 
the practice of judicial review. 
What jurisprudential vices did that same testimony point 
toward? 
A certain rigidity of intellect, displayed, for example, in 
Judge Ginsburg's willingness to assert that her personal views on 
capital punishment would not influence her judicial evaluation of 
that practice; a powerful ability to tolerate cognitive dissonance, 
as evidenced by such assertions; an evident failure to compre-
hend that the sacred text of her generation of academic lawyers, 
The Legal Process, (tentative draft, 1958) signaled the arrival of 
the characteristic crisis of modernism into the cathedral of Amer-
ican legal thought; and a resultant uncritical manifestation of the 
cognitive style exemplified by the substance of that text. 
In what way does Judge Ginsburg's jurisprudential Ur text, 
The Legal Process (tentative draft, 1958) indicate the arrival of 
the characteristic crisis of modernism in the history of American 
legal thought? 
In its eternal status as a tentative draft, rather than a pub-
lished text. 
What does this tentative status signify? 
That God is dead. 
How does the failure to publish one's work in any way indi-
cate the necrotic condition of the erstwhile Almighty Creator of 
heaven and earth? 
By signaling a sudden realization on the part of various erst-
while subcreators, including, but not limited to, novelists 
(Kafka), philosophers (Wittgenstein), architects (Gaudi), and 
legal process scholars (Hart & Sacks) that this (their wor~) is as 
good as it is going to get, and that the sudden exaltation of 
human creative labor into the sphere of the quasi- or psuedo-
divine implicitly requires of that work nothing less than perfec-
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tion, despite the overwhelming evidence that perfection is not, 
has not been, and never will be a human attribute, and that 
therefore their appointed task is impossible, absurd, and yet ab-
solutely necessary. 
What does this realization generate? 
A kind of paralysis. 
What is the source of this paralysis? 
A neurotic compulsion to devote one's life to the attainment 
of an unattainable goal. 
Such as? 
Creating sacred texts in an irremediably secular world, solv-
ing the fundamental mysteries of human existence, designing 
places of worship that will adequately honor a being who does 
not exist, and discovering the meaning of the Constitution. 
With the help of? 
The best minds of my generation. 
Including? 
Ackerman's paradigms, Bollinger's tolerance, Chemerin-
sky's anger, Dellinger's doctrines, Ely's democracy, Freeman's 
delusions, Grey's pragmatism, Halberstam's sister, Idolatry's 
cousin, Jacob's ladder, Komesar's politics, Levinson's theory, 
MacKinnon's machismo, Nagel's unhappiness, Omnipotence's 
blessing, Peller's critiques, Q's weapons, Regan's philosophy, 
Sandalow's skepticism, Thshnet's diatribes, Unger's priesthood, 
Van Alstyne's disease, Weschler's principles, Xerxes's divisions, 
Yudofs lucre, and Zeno's last paradox. 
What then does the practically unanimous ascension of 
Judge Ginsburg portend for the next decade of constitutional 
commentators? 
That the more it changes the more it stays the same. 
What emotions attend this realization? 
Anger, frustration, resignation. 
Why anger? 
Because an increasingly meaningless bureaucratized dis-
course will continue to become ever more obscure, complex, and 
indeterminate. 
Why frustration? 
Because a surfeit of cultural angst will impel lawyers and, 
especially, legal academics to proclaim with increasing fervor and 
decreasing conviction that everything is for the best in this, the 
best of all possible jurisprudential worlds. 
Why resignation? 
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Because of the evident absence of that instrumental power 
of reason over the course of human events which an age of rea-
son believes rationality by its very nature must manifest. 
Why is this instrumental power absent? 
Because the falcon cannot hear the falconer. 
What then is the answer? 
To begin to question the instrumental power of rationality. 
How well has this particular attempt succeeded? 
Less than hope allowed, more than fear permitted. 
What parable sums up the essence of our constitutional 
condition? 
They were offered the choice between becoming kings or 
the couriers of kings. The way children would, they all wanted 
to be couriers. Therefore there are only couriers who hurry 
about the world, shouting to each other-since there are no 
kings-messages that have become meaningless. They would 
like to put an end to this miserable life of theirs but they dare 
not because of their oaths of service. 
Franz Kafka 
